Abstract When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a "dummy" player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.
Introduction
The main teaching of the literature on power indices is that, in a collective choice process, voting power or influence need not to be proportional to the relative number of votes (weight) an individual or a group (player) is entitled to. An extreme and striking consequence of this non proportionality is that a player can have a positive weight but never be a member of a minimal winning coalition (a coalition that wins and the removal of a single player does not allow the coalition to win any longer). Such players have no voting power and are known as dummies.
The Luxembourg held one vote, whereas the quota for a proposition to be approved was 12 out of 17. Since other member states held an even number of votes (4 for Germany, France and Italy, 2 for Belgium and The Netherlands), Luxembourg formally was never able to make any difference in the voting process and was a dummy.
Another well known case of dummies involves Nassau County, New York (Banzhaf 1965). Nassau County's government took the form of a Board of Supervisors, one representative for each of various municipalities, who cast a block of votes. Here are the weighted voting systems used at various times by Nassau County. The passing quota shown reflects the number of votes needed to pass "ordinary legislation".
1964
The numerical weights were chosen to try to take into account the populations of the different municipalities, which were quite disparate. It is easy to see that in 1958, Oyster Bay, Long Beach and Glen Cove were dummies. It can also be checked that, in 1964, there were three dummies (North Hempstead, Glen Cove and Long Beach). After 1964, the quota was raised to guarantee that no municipality was a dummy.
A third example of dummy has recently been discovered by one of the authors (see Blancard and Lepelley 2010) in a community of municipalities in La Réunion Island (France). This community, called CIVIS (Communauté Intercommunale des VIlles Solidaires), gathered between 1997 and 2008 five municipalities: Saint-Pierre (15 representatives in the community council), Saint-Louis (10 representatives), L'EtangSalé (5), Petite-Ile (5) and Cilaos (4), the number of representatives being roughly proportional to the municipality population. In the community Council, 20 votes were necessary for a proposition to be accepted. If we suppose that the representatives of a municipality were voting as a block, it can be seen that Cilaos was a dummy: all the winning coalitions containing Cilaos remain winning when this municipality is removed. It is worth noticing that in 2008 a sixth municipality has entered the community and Cilaos is no more a dummy.
The possibility of dummy players is clearly problematic from a democratic point of view and the diversity of the examples given above suggests that the occurrence of dummies in voting games is of practical concern and could be less rare that expected in first analysis. What is the likelihood of such an undesired phenomenon ? How the distribution of weights should be arranged in order to avoid the occurrence of dummies in voting games?
We propose in this paper a theoretical investigation of these issues in the context of weighted majority games, where the quota is equal to the half of the total number of votes, plus one. Our framework and our main assumptions are introduced in Sect. 2. We propose some analytical results in Sect. 3 for weighted voting games with 4, 5 and
